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Governing Maine: 1960-2010

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In 1959 in a book entitled New England State Politics, political scientist Duane Lockard devoted a chapter to the government and politics of Maine. Lockard there made a statement that would be much repeated in and out of this state: “In few American states,” he wrote, “are the reins of government more openly or completely in the hands of a few leaders of economic interest groups than in Maine.” (1) Looking at Maine politics some 44 years later, we would, of course, need to alter that assertion. We might now want to say: In few American states over the past four decades have changes in government and politics been more significant--and more far-reaching-- than the ones that have taken place in Maine. Indeed, a transformation has taken place in government in Maine, and in the relation of government to the lives of our citizens.

This evening I would like to discuss where Maine’s state and local governments have come in the past four decades. We will look at changes in the structure and institutions of the states and localities. I also want to stress political values. The issues that confront our state and local governments are, fundamentally, conflicts over political values. It is the tension over values that shapes-- and will continue to shape-- the debates that rage over government form and governmental policy in Maine as elsewhere.

I. Political Values and Policymaking

The values about government that people share grow from the political culture in which they live and endure.(2) Maine’s political culture is deeply community-centered; it emphasizes the importance of on-going participation of citizens in the affairs of their government. This participatory culture grew from the town meeting tradition shared by the other states of New England. Still, Maine is second to none in its embrace of citizen governance. Although modeled after the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, Maine’s fundamental charter of 1820 insisted on a wider suffrage for its citizens, with no property qualifications, and on reducing property and religious requirements on persons who might hold the governorship. But like Massachusetts, Maine created a state legislature and a state executive each with significant powers—rare at a time when executives were institutionally weak. Still, the legislature had the primary place, consistent with sustaining the value of citizen participation and involvement. The slender Maine executive department established in 1820 contained three administrative officials—the attorney general, the state treasurer and the state auditor— placed in office not by the governor, but by the members of the state legislature.

The communitarian value of citizen involvement in governmental affairs has, of course, persisted. For about a century and a half—until the 1960s which is our starting point-- Maine's political culture sustained the idea that citizens not only influenced the decisions of government, but also—from their role as citizens-- directed agencies of government. The lead symbol is, of course, the town meeting through which members of the town supervised the affairs of the community in a public gathering, historically frequently during the year and then once a year, aided by a board of town elders (selectmen or selectpersons) who implemented the general mandates the community had agreed to.

It is useful to observe that the town meeting format was carried over into institutions that had much more expansive responsibilities.

I am specifically referring to the three branches of the state government. Maine's legislature, executive branch and courts all reflected a value prevalent in 19th century America--a notion of responsiveness or representativeness. One manifestation was the frequent election of public officials. Governors served initially for one year, then for two years. Legislators had a one-year term until 1880; afterward they could remain in office for two years. In its frequent elections for state offices Maine resembled other states. However, in its institutional arrangements we went beyond the idea of simply representing people. Maine's executive and judicial branches were, in some respects, as much citizen bodies as the state legislature. Department heads in the state executive branch were often chosen by boards of citizens—examples were the state education board and the state welfare board. The governor was obliged to work with the officials those bodies selected. In its courts, Maine depended on private citizens to operate many of its trial courts of limited jurisdiction, the so-called justice of the peace who often had no legal training.

2. The Professionalization of Maine Government

These historic arrangements began to shift—and to do so rapidly-- about 1960, when all the three branches of Maine's government began to undergo a transformation. They moved from the mostly citizen-run bodies--which they had been since 1820-- to governmental agencies staffed by persons specifically qualified by skills, education and experience to perform their assigned functions. The process was in its early stages generally accepted. The value of professional competence, of assigning persons to governmental positions who could technically fulfill them, did not really conflict with the value of citizen involvement. However, when the most citizen-related branch, the legislature, began to alter its habits and working style, controversy erupted. A battle between Maine voters and the legislature took place. I will look at the institutional changes in the general order in which they occurred.

The Maine Courts. The judicial branch has moved from a fragmented, loosely organized group of courts to a system that is recognized nationally as being one of the best coordinated judicial systems of any state. (3) The first major change occurred in 1961 with the creation of the District Court. The District Court replaced an arrangement

of about 75 municipal and trial justice courts, each with its own authorizing statute. The local magistrates had, of course, knowledge of local conditions. However, their verdicts, especially traffic fines, diverged hugely from court to court. Reformers stressed the need for greater uniformity. The new District Court was composed of 25 judges, organized into 13 districts, who held court at 33 locations. Maine, for the first, time, had professional judges who were serving full-time in all its courts.

Consolidation of the courts continued in other ways. In 1976 the state assumed responsibility for funding of the Superior Court. It had been supported by the individual counties. Court reporters and other personnel were now state employees. To manage the court system, the legislature in 1975 created an administrative office of the courts. The office was headed by a director who served under the authority of the chief justice of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court. A chief judge was appointed for the district court and four regional presiding justices were named in the Superior Court to coordinate the handling of caseloads.

Maine's trial courts thus moved to state, not local, control. No longer would a non-lawyer citizen judge hold court in a town, nor would a private attorney individually set the hearing of a civil case in his or her county. The loss of local influence was, hopefully, balanced by greater uniformity of justice across the state. Citizens would, of course, still influence their courts and the way the courts operated. However, they had to do so through influencing the content of the legislative statutes that regulated the courts. The judiciary had become, in the 1960s and 1970s, an integrated, professional state institution.

A different kind of judicial development has been a closer relationship between the Maine Supreme Judicial Court and the U.S. Supreme Court. For many decades, the nation's high Court did not review in full opinion any Maine case. Since 1980, on the other hand, the Court has examined eight cases appealed from Maine's Supreme Judicial Court. Three of them involved provisions in the Bill of Rights in the U.S. Constitution, while the other five tested the constitutionality of federal statutes. Among the more important cases were Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne (1987) which concerned the federal Employees Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 and Alden v. Maine (1999) which questioned whether the 11th Amendment to the Constitution barred state employees from using a state court to sue the state government over the application of a federal wage law. (4)

In both the Halifax and Alden decisions, U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Maine Supreme Judicial Court's settlement of the issues in votes of 5 to 4. Looking at the cases generally, Maine has had a higher proportion of "wins" than most states. The Supreme Court has transformed several Maine high court decisions, in the past two decades, into national judicial policy.

The Maine Executive. The executive department of Maine government has undergone an evolution somewhat similar to that of the judiciary. (5) It has move from the fragmentation of activities to the coordination of functions under the governor. At the

beginning, the few executive offices that existed, such as secretary of state and attorney general, were filled through legislative election by constitutional requirement. When other executive agencies became necessary, a common practice was to create a citizen commission or a board to oversee them. An example was the state highway commission, established in 1915 as the state began to develop a system of paved roads for the automobile. By law the oversight Commission had three members, no more than two of whom by law could be members of the same political party. The Commission chairman served a term of seven years, which was five years longer than the term of the governor. The effect was to make the supervision of the highway system—one of the most important responsibilities in state government-- almost entirely independent of the governor's control

After Edmund Muskie became governor in 1955, he requested a review of the scattered state executive branch agencies by the public administration service of Chicago. In its report that group determined the Maine had 29 major operating departments, supervised by 62 officials, all but four of whom (mostly constitutional officers elected by the legislature) had terms of office—from three to nine years-- exceeding that of the governor, who had a two year term. Nine departments, like the Highway Commission, were supervised by boards some of whose members were selected by interest groups directly associated with the work of the department. The remaining 20 departments had single heads, but the governor's control of them was limited by the Executive Council.

The Executive Council was a group of seven officials chosen by the legislature (and thus who were themselves normally former legislators) to work with the governor in personnel and budget matters. It was sometimes called the “the hidden executive.” The Executive Council had the right to “advise and consent” over each gubernatorial appointment. Further, it had powers over changes in the state budget when the legislature was not in session. During the Muskie years--and later under Governor Kenneth Curtis-- the Executive Council was always Republican and nearly always a source of gubernatorial obstruction.

Following the report of the public administration service, Gov. Muskie pushed for reforms. Elements in the Republican party and in the existing bureaucracy prevented major change. Still, the executive branch began to modernize. The state approved a constitutional amendment extending the governor's term from two years to four years. The first governor under the new provision was John Reed, elected in 1962 to a four-year term. Additionally, election day was moved from September to November, bringing Maine state elections into line with the rest of the country.

The reforms envisioned in the Muskie years finally took hold in the second term of Gov. Ken Curtis. In 1971 the legislature passed a re-organization measure creating 20 administrative departments, each department headed by a commissioner nominated by the governor and who served at the governor's pleasure. Shortly after, in 1975, the Executive Council was abolished by constitutional amendment. For the first time Maine had a true cabinet arrangement in its executive branch. Effective coordination of state executive departments had been a theme for much of the 20th century, beginning in such

states as New York and Illinois in the 1920s. The idea took hold slowly in smaller states, especially those having modest public expenditures where the need for coordination was, accordingly, less pressing. It was probably symbolic that Maine chose the first years of the 1970s to establish the pyramidal form of state administration-- with the governor in charge in fact as well as in theory- for that was a period in which important changes in public policy were taking place as well.

The general direction of Maine was, in the 1970s and afterwards, one of a rather rapid expansion of state public services. Fueling the rise of a service-oriented state government was the enactment of the state income tax in 1969, with bi-partisan support from a Democratic Governor Ken Curtis and the Republican legislature. Re-election of Governor Curtis in 1970 and the survival of the tax against a challenge in a statewide referendum in 1971 confirmed the new direction of state government. Among the many new programs was a spate of environmental measures that placed the state at the forefront of the national environmental movement. In education, Maine increased the share of state support for schools, and enacted legislation to create greater statewide equity in support of public schools.

The expansion of state activities could be measured in budget increases. Total general expenditures increased from slightly less than \$145 million in 1960 to \$373 million in 1970. In 1980, expenditures were \$1.326 billion and by 1990 they had grown to \$2.743 billion. Put another way, state government spending was increasing by two to three times each decade. During part of the 1980s, in fact, Maine expenditures were rising by a level nearly twice the national average for states.

The growing prominence of state government altered the citizens' perception of the state's power structure. Those interest groups that had once been dominant in Augusta had receded in the public's view. Asked in a survey in the 1970s by the Maine Times the question: "Who Runs Maine," the answers centered on the heads of companies such as the Central Maine Power and the Central Maine Railroad. When people were approached with a similar question some 15 years later, the Maine Times found the answers more diffuse, with no one group predominate. As the paper commented: "Maine has progressed from an individualistic to an institutional power structure." But among the institutions particularly cited was the state bureaucracy, which was now seen to be pervasive in all areas of public policy. (6)

The Maine Legislature. The third area of change involves the state legislature. Here the participatory value was historically most entrenched. It was here that the clash between the values of participation and professionalism would become most acute. We prided ourselves on having a citizen legislature, one that convened for relatively brief sessions to conduct the people's business, had small districts to insure close ties to constituents and had high turnover to insist that policies discussed in Augusta were always aligned to local thinking.

The modifications in the legislature since 1960 have been both more profound and much more controversial than alterations in the courts and the executive. Like the other

branches--and like assemblies in other states—our state legislature became more institutionalized. Professional experience and technical skills were stressed. What made that process different was that the key value of citizen participation appeared to get lost. The upshot was a serious political clash—in the early 1990s-- over governmental structure. The division was one of the most serious Maine has ever experienced. It led to the imposition of term limits on state legislators. (7)

So let us notice the background of that struggle.

Changes in the legislature began rather quickly in the 1960s. First of all, Democrats became a competitive party. They challenged the solid Republican control of both chambers that had persisted for many decades. In 1975, Democrats gained a majority of seats in the House (a margin which they have never relinquished). In 1981 they secured a majority in the state senate.

Additionally, legislators began serving for several terms. The investment of time and money required in political campaigns encouraged members to seek re-election. Their rate of success was high. In the 1970s, turnover in each legislative session dropped from 50 percent to about 25 percent. A corps of career legislators began to appear, especially in the House. The best known was John Martin, representing Eagle Lake. Martin became floor leader of his party in 1973, and Speaker when the Democrats won control of the House in 1975. He transformed an office that had customarily turned over every legislative session into the second most powerful position in state government, and elevated the authority of the entire legislature in the process.

At the same time, the greater complexity of lawmaking fostered legislative bureaucratization. In 1973, policy specialists were, for the first time, made a formal part of the legislative operation. The legislature established the Office of Policy and Legal Analysis, employing about a dozen professionals to advise its joint standing committees. Soon after, an Office of Fiscal Analysis was established to provide assistance to the appropriations and taxation committees. By the end of that decade, the legislature had enacted a sunset law, under which executive departments underwent formal, periodic oversight by the legislature's Office of Program and Policy Review.

The legislature was changing in other ways as well. Second legislative sessions—in even numbered years-- became the norm in the early 1980s, effectively moving the legislature from biennial sessions to annual sessions. Although officially limited to “emergency” measure, the new second session handled many policy questions carried over from the first session. Further, the standing committees—with more experienced members and the aid of staff—started to occupy a more decisive role in the legislative process. Another innovation was the influence of the Legislative Council, composed of the presiding officers and floor leaders of each party in each chamber. The Council established procedures for the chambers. It also named the legislature's executive director, an official who by the late 1980s was overseeing more than 100 professional and support staff persons.

Despite—or perhaps because of-- all these new arrangements, the legislature seemed to be losing its critical link to the voters. Maine still had a turnover higher than many states, and lower legislative compensation. Nonetheless, a statewide impression grew that the legislature was no longer a “citizen” assembly. Warning signs began to appear in the late 1980s. Evidence could be found in growing media attention to high legislative costs. A more ominous indicator was the frequent use Maine voters were making of the initiative and referendum devices to make law. Between 1909-- when the procedure for popular lawmaking was added to the state constitution-- and 1969, the state held only six referenda. In contrast, between 1970 and 1991, the state held a total of 22 referenda. In about half of those occasions, the voters’ expressed preference at the polls was in opposition to the legislature’s decision in Augusta. Popular lawmaking—bypassing the legislature-- was on the rise.

Beginning the early 1980s bills were introduced in the legislature to impose term limits on members. The measures at first found little support beyond a handful of conservative Republicans who regarded term limits as a way of curtailing the authority of Speaker John Martin. However, after the national term limits movement began about 1990, interest in the idea broadened. Then two dramatic events—the budget crisis in state government in 1991 which shut down state government for three weeks and a scandal in the Speaker’s office in 1992—dramatically put the idea of term limits into play in Maine politics. It wasn’t long before term limits supporters had collected far more than enough signatures to put the issue to a referendum. When that occurred, in November 1993, Maine voters endorsed the idea by a margin of nearly two to one. Maine became the only northeastern state to adopt term limits. Since 1996 legislators are limited to four terms (or eight years) of continuous service in the same legislative chamber.

Term limits suggests that the competing values followed in organizing governmental bodies can and do clash. It may be said that Maine voters sought through term limits to restore the value of citizen participation. They tried to reign in the value of professionalism that was threatening to separate the legislature from its constituent base. I want to say more on this point as we look down the road to 2010. First, however, we need to notice the trends that have taken place at the local and regional levels.

3. The Growth of Local Government

Measured purely by numbers of units, Maine’s local governments have seen relatively little change since 1960. We have the same number of counties (16) and almost the same number of towns and cities (492) as we did 40 years ago. In contrast, we have fewer school districts, thanks in large part to the Sinclair Act of 1957, which consolidated very small districts—the little red schoolhouses-- into larger districts (School Administrative Districts) and in turn increased the state’s financial aid to schools. School districts diminished from over 400 in the 1950s to the current total of 286. But we have seen an increase in other types of special districts, such as water and sewer districts, and we have added regional planning districts to our governmental mix.

Overall, then, Maine continues rich in local governments. We are a long way from having the largest number of localities among the states (Illinois has that distinction with nearly 7,000 units.) Still, our 827 units are a substantial number. It puts us second among the New England states, which share in the tradition of small towns. There are currently almost 88,000 local units of government in the 50 states. Maine has nearly 1 percent of them. Since our population represents about one-half of 1 percent of the nation, we have about double the number of local government entities, measured on a population basis, among the states.

An important trend since 1960 is that localities have developed a greater degree of structural integrity. (8) By that I mean that they have been given more discretion under state law to frame their own particular arrangements. The key development in this regard occurred in 1969, when the state added a home rule amendment to the constitution. Until then, most communities had no powers not expressly provided them in state law, leaving it to the state legislature to spend time each session dealing with the intricacies of a municipality's government. The home rule provision stipulates that "the inhabitants of any municipality shall have the power to alter and amend their charters on all matters not prohibited by Constitution or general law, which are local and municipal in character." For some years, Maine courts were inclined to give a narrow reading to those powers. However, in 1987 the legislature revised its enabling act, specifying that "it should be liberally construed to effect its purposes," and the Maine Supreme Judicial Court seems to have followed that direction. In 1993 it held that "municipal legislation will be voided only where...(the) legislation would frustrate the purpose of state law."

Currently about 75 towns and cities have charters. (9) The advantage of a charter is that a community may design its own political arrangements subject only to the limitation that it not violate state law. Among other advantages, the charter form has been valuable to communities desiring to adopt a town or city manager form of local government, but preferring to craft a structure that differs from the Enabling Law the state passed in 1939. Maine has continued in the past four decades to be a leader among states in the use of the town and city manager form of local governmental administration. Currently nearly half of all our towns have managers. Of course, we have attained that number by adapting a form intended for larger communities in most states—typically those of 10,000 or more population which have managers working with city councils—to suit the needs of our many, smaller jurisdictions. Town managers serve in Maine with town meetings and boards of selectpersons as much as they do with elected councils.

Counties have also become somewhat more independent of state government. (10) In the 1970s, the state took over responsibility for the Superior Court. In the early 1980s, counties gained the authority to formulate and implement their own budgets, a responsibility that had earlier been lodged in the hands of the county legislative delegations. In the past two decades, counties have been authorized to develop charters and engage county managers. Maine's counties remain, however, among of the weakest in the nation. Efforts to build them into more significant governments, ones that might provide certain types of municipal services, have failed. In the light of the counties' multiplicity of elected positions, and the traditions of patronage and partisan politics in

some of them, town and city managers have been reluctant to envision them as service centers. Here the value of citizen participation inherent in county government seems to run against the value of professionalism implicit in the manager form of local government.

Like the three branches of the state government, Maine municipalities have expanded their staffs and have developed cohorts of professionally trained persons in policy areas mostly unknown forty years ago such as environmental protection and technology. Not all their growth, of course, has come from local initiation. State government plays a major role in the governmental arrangements of every municipality. For instance, the responsibilities of positions such as town clerk, tax collector, treasurer, assessor, code enforcement officer and many others are heavily described by state statute.

Over the period we are examining Maine's municipalities have grown considerably faster than has the state government. Let's look at the employment levels of the state and localities through two snapshots in time: the year 1960 and the year 2001. (11) In 1960, Maine had more full-time state employees per 10,000 population than the national average; we had 108 compared to the 50-state figure of 79. That put us ahead of the national average—but I might say that statistic is fairly typical for large, rural states according to the measure we use. The maintenance of a state highway system requires a certain number of workers regardless of population. Thus in a sparsely populated state there is often a high proportion of state employees per 10,000 population. Looking at 2001, we had risen to 167 state employees, certainly a significant increase. Interestingly, however, other states had grown at faster rate, nearly doubling their state workforces by that time; the national average grew from 79 to 147 full-time employees. Maine state government remained ahead, but we were not as far above the national average as we had been 40 years earlier. In the light of the great policy initiatives Maine witnessed during that period, the growth in our state workforce was quite moderate.

The local level tells a somewhat different story. In 1960, we had about 20 percent fewer full-time local government employees per 10,000 population than other states. In Maine we had 188 employees; the national figure for states was 232 employees. That pattern was consistent with the historic emphasis on citizen governance I described earlier. We had a lot of government structure at the local level-- to be sure--but parts of it were in the hands of citizens volunteering their time and individuals serving on a part-time basis. By 2001, on the other hand, our number of local government personnel had grown to 413 full-time employees per 10,000 population. In the 40-year period, Maine's number of local government employees (persons employed on a full-time basis) had more than doubled. The current figure exceeds slightly the average for all states (393 employees at the local level). I might add that the rate of growth in Maine noticeably accelerated in the 1990s, with an increase in municipal employment in that decade alone of nearly 30 percent.

4. The Receding Federal Partner

Before looking further at the local picture, I want to put the changes in Maine's governments in the context of the federal system. Since 1960 the federal government has, on the whole, been more of a provider of funds than a taker of funds to the state of Maine. Currently, for every dollar sent to Washington, about \$1.30 is returned to Maine. That favorable balance is due to, among other factors, our ranking as one of the lower per capita income states and to the aggressive pursuit of federal grants in the past 40 years by some state administrations. In more recent times, however, the relationship between the states and the federal government has shifted dramatically.

A major change began to take place about 1980, about in the middle of the period we are discussing, when the Reagan administration took office. At that time, the target of federal grants-in-aid policy moved from places-- governmental jurisdictions-- to people. Federal dollars no longer were mostly directed to states and municipalities for programs such as transportation and environmental protection, which aid particularly expanded during the Nixon administration in the early 1970s to include revenue sharing and block grants. Instead, after 1980, federal dollars went to groups and classes of individuals who were defined by federal statute as eligible for various types of federal assistance. The largest of these programs is Medicaid, which currently accounts for 25 percent of all federal aid, and which has become the second largest item in state budgets after public school funding.

The reason for the shift away from aiding places to assisting people is related to federal deficits. When deficits grew in the 1980s, Congress understandably determined that supporting people was more important than aiding governments. The shrinkage of support for subnational governments has been variously described as "fend for yourself federalism" and "fiscal federalism fizzling." (12) It means that states and their localities are today more on their own financially. It is interesting that the current issue in Maine of public school funding—specifically, what share the state should contribute—was a major issue some 30 years.

That struggle, however, was fought out against the backdrop of a very different federal system. Then the federal revenue sharing program, enacted by Congress in 1972, had just gotten underway. Municipalities received an amount equivalent to nearly 10 percent of their budgets. The state government received some \$30 million as its share, an amount it turned almost entirely into a new school finance program aimed at equalizing financial resources for school districts throughout the state. That type of federal partnership ended in the 1980s with the demise of revenue-sharing. So today we are trying to figure out the appropriate financial balance between state and local governments, with the federal government playing a much more limited role.

The changes in the way funds are directed from Washington have highlighted the state's current role as the senior partner in state-local fiscal relations. In 1961 Maine state and local governments each collected, from their own sources, very comparable amounts of revenue—a little over \$100 million each. That was, of course, before the state income tax had arrived. In 2001, in a different environment, the state collected almost twice as much revenue from its own sources as localities did from theirs. In 2001, the state also

provided a larger proportion of its funds to localities to carry out their programs and services.

5. Conclusions and Observations

So, in this 40-year period, we have traveled to a point where our local governments have grown more institutionally and legally distant from the state, especially from the state legislature, which once monitored their day-to-day activities closely. Yet, they are now more intertwined than ever with Augusta in budgetary and financial matters.

Looking to the year 2010, it seems that struggles over our governing arrangements—which, I argue, are really clashes over political values, namely, the value of citizen governance and citizen participation versus the equally relevant value of expertise, competence and coordination in the framing and administering of public policy—will be fought out at the local level. The clashes will be reflected in debates over defining state-local relationships in various policy arenas. They will inform discussions of the allocation and use of public resources. They will concern decisions over local consolidation and cooperation, that is, how much direction should come from the state and how much the sharing of services should be instigated by individual communities.

The critical questions are: How we will deal creatively with those tensions? How we will sustain the values of both participation and professionalism in our public life without inflicting on ourselves damaging political divisions.

As that debate continues, two features of Maine's governing style should be kept in mind. One is that our state has a basically moderate political culture, one that looks toward consensus on most major issues. We tend to eschew extremes in politics and in ideology. The transformation of our state institutions in the past 40 years is, I think, revealing of that. Consensus doesn't always prevail—the battle over legislative term limits in 1993 indicated that a serious divide had opened between our citizens and the legislative institution—but it seems generally to be attainable.

The other quality of Maine governance is our long-standing willingness to innovate, to look for methods and solutions that work and are special to this state. We see that throughout our state and local governments—from legislative elected executive officers in Augusta to the hybrid nature of local government management in many smaller communities, where a professional manager works with a town meeting. Those well-established habits of moderation, innovation and pragmatism should bode well for us as we look ahead to the end of this decade.

Notes

1. Lockard, Duane, New England State Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 79.
2. These ideas are adapted from Herbert Kaufman, Politics and Policies in State and Local Government (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963).
3. For changes in Maine's courts, see Harriet P. Henry, The Maine District Court: A Quarter Century of Progress (Tower Publishing Co., 1987) and Administrative Unification of Maine State Courts (Boston, MA: National Center for State Courts, 1975).
4. Kenneth T. Palmer, "The Maine Supreme Judicial Court and the U.S. Supreme Court: Two Decades of Review," Maine Bar Journal, Vol. 15, No. 2 (April 2000), pp. 86-90.
5. For changes in Maine's executive departments, see Organization and Administration of the Government of the State of Maine (Chicago, IL: Public Administration Service, 1956) and Toward a More Responsive and Effective State Government: A Report by the Governor's Task Force on Government Reorganization (Augusta, ME: Office of the Governor, 1969).
6. Phyllis Austin, "Who Runs Maine?" Maine Times, July 22, 1988, p. 8.
7. Matthew C. Moen and Kenneth T. Palmer, "Maine: The Cutting Edge of Term Limits," in The Test of Time: Coping with Legislative Term Limits, ed. By Rick Farmer, John David Rausch, Jr., and John C. Green (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002), pp. 47-59.
8. G. Thomas Taylor and Kenneth T. Palmer, "Maine." in Home Rule in America: A Fifty-State Handbook, ed. By Dale Krane, Platon N. Rigor and Melvin B. Hill, Jr. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2001), pp. 183-190.
9. Geoffrey Herman, "Municipal Charters: A Comparative Analysis of 75 Maine Charters." Maine Townsman, August 1992, pp. 5-15.
10. Kenneth T. Palmer, G. Thomas Taylor and Marcus LiBrizzi, Maine Politics and Government (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), ch. 13

11. Statistics are drawn from The Book of the States (Lexington, Kentucky: Council of State Governments, 1962-3 and 2003)

12. John Kincaid, "Is Fiscal Federalism Fizzling," in Book of the States, 2003 (Lexington, Kentucky: Council of State Governments, 2003), pp. 26-31.